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Abstract 
The Collor reforms in economic policy represent a novel approach to stem 
hyperinflation, particularly in freezing savings accounts beyond a minimum level for 18 
months. While this drastic reduction in the velocity of money has had a less regressive 
impact on the population (in the short run) than more conventional deflationary measures, 
it has clearly damaged the long run potential for domestic savings mobilization and financial 
intermediation. Furthermore this will gain little in the long run unless the government 
drastically reduces its public sector borrowing requirements. Privatization, public sector 
layoffs, and attention to a more depreciated real exchange rate, the removal of quantitative 
restrictions on imports and a reduced uniform tariff structure are all necessary to restructure 
the economy for the future. 
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THE SE'ITING: 
The current development scenario in Brazil is full of ambiguities and uncertainties. 
This is certainly characteristic of the country's policy stance throughout the decade of the 
1980s. Before discussing the challenge of the early nineties it is useful to review the growth 
performance and policy issues of the past decade, particularly the last half of the decade. 
Per capita growth was stagnant over the past decade 1981-89 (-0.4 percent per year). 
The country was no better off in 1989 than it was at the beginning of the decade. While this 
is a dismal record in comparison to previous decades, it doesn't compare badly to most 
Latin American countries over the 1980s. However, this generous interpretation of the 
relative performance of Brazil vis-a-vis the disastrous record of Peru, Argentina, Venezuela, 
Nicaragua, and others is hardly a complimentary reference group for Brazilians to feel 
comfortable about. 
The important reference point is the relative standing of Brazil at the end of the 
1970s when it was considered one of the better performing countries in the LDC world 
facing the challenges of the post-1973 oil crisis. By the end of the 1980s Brazil has slipped 
badly in the ranking of countries that have worked out their development potential to face 
the 1990s. The main problem is that the country has not been able to marshal! sufficient 
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government's increasing access to the capital markets to finance its operational deficit. All 
this leads to a distorted and wide spread in the structure of real rates of interest in financial 
markets. 
The core problem in Brazil grows out the rising share of internal debt in the 
Brazilian economy. Brazil in effect, has substituted internal debt for taxes. Hence it is 
possible for policymakers to claim that the Central Governments fiscal accounts (i.e. the 
primary balance) are in balance, namely tax revenues equal central government expendi-
tures. However, there are many other budgets in Brazil where the real action occurs, state 
and local government budgets, public enterprise budgets, the monetary budget, etc. In the 
end the government incurs a high public sector borrowing requirement to finance through 
the issue of government notes the comprehensive deficit in the total public sector. In terms 
of the operational balance (i.e. in which the interest cost on the internal debt is included as 
a part of government expenditures) the government's deficit has been rising rapidly. The 
resort to this mechanism has shortened the average term length of public debt to little more 
than 24 hours. The interest on this internal debt is rapidly rising as a share of GDP. And, 
of course, this rapid issue of internal debt generates an increase in the money supply feeding 
inflation. 
Another consequence of this action is the increased inefficiency this introduces into 
the economy. This occurs in three ways. First, many of the projects financed through this 
internal debt have a low rate of economic return. The pro-alcohol program, the Brasilia 
Maranhao railway of the Sarney Administration, the Nuclear plant investments, the 
incredibly expensive Rio and Sao Paulo subway systems, and many others could never pass 
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a rigorous benefit cost test despite the billions poured into these ventures. Moreover these 
are not one shot deals. They create recurrent costs that act as a persistent drain on public 
resources through time. 
Secondly, the wide range of subsidies granted to selected private sector activities are 
in effect subsidizing inefficient production, otherwise they would not need the subsidies. 
These subsidies can either be fiscal subsidies (tax exemptions or write-downs which add to 
the deficit) or credit subsidies granted through the moneta.Iy budget (which in the end 
require an increase in internal debt and the money supply). 
Thirdly, the remaining private sector activities not blessed with privileged access to 
public sector resources suffer from the "crowding out" syndrome for working capital 
associated with the growing share of public sector debt financed through the capital markets. 
This action increases the cost of credit for the unprotected private sector and creates a cost 
push inflationary element into this non-priveledged private sector activity. The combination 
of all three elements described above have led to an inefficient allocation of resources and 
have circumscribed the role of an efficient and resilient private sector in the development 
process. 
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization are not popular ideas in many political 
and professional circles in Brazil. The country has always shown a strong bias for a 
dominant state role in development. The recently created Constitution reflects this 
nationalist and populist sentiment with a large role for the state in many essentially 
unregulatable areas. Given this bias, it is not surprising to note that the political economy 
of liberalization has largely bypassed Brazil in the decade of the 1980s. 
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Many countries in East and Southeast Asia have engaged in substantial liberalization 
of their economies in the past decade. African economies are now facing this challenge and, 
of course, the Eastern European countries are the most recent adherents to this policy 
stance. In Latin America, Chile has long been a convert to these policies, but this example 
is always compromised in the eyes of most Brazilians due to the political framework within 
which it was implemented. Post-1988 Mexico, however, is probably the most interesting and 
relevant case for Brazilians to study with some interest. 
The Mexican Connection 
Mexico is a large country, as is Brazil, hence the import substitution bias has been 
a natural phenomenon. Indeed, Mexico insulated itself from a liberal trade regime to such 
an extent that it refused to join GATI until recently. A strong state enterprise sector also 
dominated Mexico's heyday of development with public sector enterprises in most of the 
same major capital and intermediate good sectors as in Brazil. In short, both countries have 
much in common in terms of size of market, industrialization and trade strategy, and state 
sector dominance in both the production of goods and services and in heavy corporatist 
regulatory traditions. 
Yet from the middle 1980s to the present, and particularly from the post-1988 Salinas 
de Gortari regime onwards, Mexico has been rapidly dismantling its protectionist regime and 
state sector, and opening its economy to international competitive forces. By the end of 
1990 all QRs will have been converted to tariffs and uniform tariff rates established between 
10 to 15 percent. A competitive real exchange rate has been established with manufactured 
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exports rising rapidly. The country has joined GA TI and talks are continuing on creating 
a free trade agreement with the U.S., something that would have been unheard of five yea.rs 
ago. Public sector employment and subsidies have been drastically curtailed, tax reforms 
are being realized, and a growing number of state enterprises are being sold to private and 
foreign interests. These actions reflect a close parallel to many of the actions that should 
be undertaken in Brazil. 
However, there is one important difference between the two countries, the 
institutional framework within which these actions have been taken. The unique national 
political culture of the PRI has allowed Mexico an institutional leverage to sustain 
unpopular economic measures over a sufficient period of time to reduce its operational 
deficit and begin to gain recovery in a radically altered policy regime. This leverage does 
not exist in Brazil which makes the future of the Collar Plan far more problematical. 
Tbe Collor J.>IDD 
1. The Collar Plan of March 1990 had to face the challenge of the lack of 
credibility growing out of previously failed stabiliution programs. All Brazilian 
administrations have to engage in some degree of overkill to make up for this 
deficiency of past efforts to affect inflationary expectations quickly. The novelty of 
the Collar Plan lay in the froezing of saviuas accoyJJ15 be.ygnd a miuimw limitJoi: lB 
WQDtba, a strategy hitherto never tried before. In addition the initial burden of 
adjustment fell on the wealthier segments of society, just the opposite of most 
conventional stabilization programs. This generated more popular support than is 
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customary for deflationary measures. The second round effect, however, will very 
likely spread to the working class as unemployment rises with the decline in 
economic activity growing out of the abrupt decline in the velocity of money 
circulation caused by the savings account freeze. 
A strong negative consequence of this action is to permanently weaken the 
incentives for savings mobilization through the financial system. This is particularly 
unfortunate in light of the declining flow of external funding for Brazil's development 
and the growing weakness of tax measures to generate sufficient revenue to cover the 
fiscal deficit. Clearly the massive sale of state enterprises and cut-back in current 
expenditures (i.e., public sector employment) is needed to reduce the global deficit 
(i.e., the public sector borrowing requirement). 
Finally, it is becoming apparent through the ensuing months of the Collor 
Reform, that special exceptions are being made to the savings account freeze, 
permitting firms to honor outstanding debts, tax payments, etc. In the end it is the 
individual middle class saver who will find no way of escaping the freeze, thereby 
bearing the burden of the reform. It is highly unlikely that the government will 
properly index the value of these accounts to offset inflation over the next 18 months. 
The net effect of this action will be a massive hidden tax on largely middle class 
savers. 
2. A second important policy arena is the real exchange rate. Brazil has 
traditionally enjoyed a competitive export sector both in basic commodities (and their 
derivatives) and in manufactured products. However this competitiveness has always 
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had to overcome periodically overvalued exchange rates used to stem inflationary 
pressures. In the past, export subsidies have been used to offset this competitive 
disadvantage. More recently (from June 1989 to March 1990) the real exchange rate 
has appreciated close to 40 percent. The decline in export growth over this same 
period, especially in manufactured exports, reflects this gradual loss in competitive-
ness. Since March the Collor Plan has carried out a nominal devaluation of the new 
currency of roughly 20 percent. This roughly equals a similar real devaluation given 
little inflation during this period. However the effective exchange rate devaluation 
is much less once allowance is made for the removal of export subsidies in the Plan. 
More time will be needed before one can sort out the net effect of nominal 
devaluation, inflation and the change in the net subsidy position for Brazilian exports. 
3. The net bias in the overall trade and exchange rate regime also depends on 
the overall effective level of protection which brings us to the third polky arena, 
quantitative restrictions on imports and the tariff structure. The Collor Plan includes 
a measure to convert QRs into tariffs but it would appear that no implementing 
action has been undertaken to date in this regard. This first step clearly has to occur 
before any liberalization can be launched on reducing the levels of effective 
protection through tariff reforms. With such a large number of QRs in place it is 
almost impossible to measure effective levels of protection through tariffs. A more 
aggressive policy of exchange devaluation could be pursued to substitute for the 
decline in protection through trade reforms. The advantage of a sustained 
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depreciation of the real exchange rate is that it does not discriminate against or 
among exports as does tariff protection. 
4. However a more aggressive real exchange rate policy will add inflationary 
5. 
pressures through the higher cost of imports unless strong complementary action is 
taken to reduce the overall fiscal deficit in the operational balance (i.e. the budgetary 
balance that includes the interest cost on the internal debt as an expenditure in the 
government accounts). These actions require a shrinking role for the state in the 
economy through a sustained reduction in public sector employment, subsidies and 
the sale of more state enterprises and the dismantling of autarquias. 
Privatization will not be an easy task in Brazil. Measures in this regard have 
been half-hearted to date. Some selective role for foreign capital is possible here, 
but any wholesale entrance of foreign capital into commanding positions in many 
state enterprises through debt-swap arrangements would be very unpopular in the 
present political environment. Yet the present state of the economy does not suggest 
that there is substantial private domestic capital available for this task. It has been 
reported that banks have been forced to buy government bonds to help carry out 
privatization measures. Banks presumably would pay for shares in the public 
enterprises through the sale of these bonds. This action is allegedly reinforced 
through a sliding scale eroding the value of these bonds through time thereby 
inducing their quick use to buy state enterprise assets. These measures are still 
imperfectly documented (at least to this writer) and therefore their impact on 
promoting the sale of state assets unclear. 
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Conclusions 
No matter how packaged, a combination of relatively orthodox stabilization and 
liberalization measures are essential for Brazil at this time. The issue is not their initial 
adoption, but rather staying the course for a sufficient period of time to effectively reduce 
inflationary expectations, on the one hand, and promote a more efficient path of recovery 
on the other hand. 
The two countries most ideally positioned to grow successfully in the 1990s are very 
likely Chile and Mexico. Chile for the past five years has recorded the highest rate of 
growth in Latin America. Moreover this growth has been associated with low inflation, a 
diminishing foreign debt and a rapid growing non-copper export sector. Moreover the new 
team of economic managers under President Alwin have stated they will not alter the basic 
parameters of economic policy established by the previous regime. Having said this 
however, it must be recognized that both these countries carried out a wide ranging 
alteration of their economic policy regimes within essentially a non-democratic political 
framework (or for Mexico a coercive consensus within a corporatist political structure). 
Brazil's unpopular measures will be undertaken within a substantially weaker set of political 
institutions and with substantially less consensus concerning the proper path for future 
development. Never has the political economy of reform ever been so dependent and 
vulnerable to the political dimension of reform. 
